Federalist #17

The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (cont.)  (Hamilton) 

In this paper, Hamilton delineates those powers properly within the province of the states and those properly within the province of the Union.  He further expresses the belief that it will always be easier for the state entities to encroach upon the national authorities than it will ever be for the national authorities to encroach upon the states.  Because the states will always generally possess the confidence and good graces of their populace, they will always be able to prevent encroachment by the national government.

As for the delineation of powers, he specifically believes the regulation of the state police apparatus, the administration of intrastate justice (both civil and criminal), and the direction of agriculture and other similar matters are concerns that should rightly be kept within the purview of each state and there should be no desire on the part of the national government to usurp these state responsibilities.  The national government, on the other hand, should have particular control over commerce, finance, negotiation, and war. 

Here, Hamilton stresses that the citizens of the individual states have the power to control expansive authoritarian overtures by the national government and that the people of the states should have greater affinity for their own local governments than they do for the government of the Union.  Hamilton attributes this notion to human nature and explains how a man is more attached to his family than to his neighborhood; more attached to his neighborhood than to has community at large; and more attached to his local government than to his more distant national government. 

Hamilton also expresses the belief that this attraction to the local government is reinforced through the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice.  He refers to such administration as "the immediate and visible guardian of life and property" and contends that it has the capacity to impress upon the minds of the people "affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government."  While of obvious benefit to the respective states, such prevailing popular attitudes present the states as "dangerous rivals to the power of the Union."  Hamilton had also previously noted that there is intrinsic weakness in all federal constitutions. 

To historically expand on his various contentions, Hamilton delves into the ancient feudal systems and points out how the more localized barons usually triumphed over the more distantly removed prince.  He also specifically uses the example of Scotland and references how the notion of localized clanship constantly prevailed over the power of the monarch.

Hamilton will continue his discussion in subsequent Federalist Papers.