Hamilton discusses the remaining powers of the Senate. In particular, he broaches the idea of the Senate as the “court for the trail of impeachments.” The people tried before the Senate would be those whom violated “public trust…immediately to the society itself.” Hamilton realizes an impeachment court would be hard to form in a branch that is “wholly elective” because there is the danger “that the decision will be regulated more by comparative strength of parties then by real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.” However, Hamilton states even though there may be problems, the “…convention….thought the Senate the most fit depository of this important trust.” Hamilton continues in the following paragraph to describe why the Senate is the best fit for the job of impeachment. He then ponders, which other body if not the Senate, could be the operators of the impeachment process?
The Supreme Court is the next body Hamilton analyzes as an arbitrator of impeachments. He explains that it is “much to be doubted whether the members of that tribunal would…be endowed with so eminent a position of fortitude called for in the execution of so difficult a task.” He also believes the justices would not “possess the degree and authority” needed to carry out the impeachment trials. If the Supreme Court did not possess these two attributes, Hamilton argues this would pose a danger to “the accused” and “public tranquility.” Hamilton also lists other factors that would make the Supreme Court an inept decision maker in impeachment trials. First, there is a necessity for a “numerous court.” Second, there will be “no jury to stand between the judges who are to pronounce the sentence of the law and the party who is to receive or suffer it.” These factors alone, in Hamilton’s point of view, are enough to deem the Supreme Court “an improper substitute for the Senate” in regards to fair and balanced impeachment ability.
Hamilton next considers combining the Supreme Court and the Senate to handle the demands of the impeachment process. He concurs that there would be a few advantages to the combined body. However, Hamilton stresses the cons would definitely outweigh the pros in this situation. Mostly, Hamilton fears the “double prosecution to which the offender would be liable.” Next, Hamilton proposes a panel of “persons wholly distinct from the other departments of government.” Hamilton argues this would “increase the complexity of the political machine…add to a new spring to the government…be attributed with a heavy expense…and be subject to a variety of casualties and inconveniences.” In closing, Hamilton suggests that, even if the measures listed above are not desirable, the Constitution should not be rejected. He continues that is “mankind were to resolve to agree on an institution of government until every part of it had been adjusted to the most exact standard of perfection, society would soon become a general scene of anarchy.”
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