In Federalist 51, Madison is explaining how the government should be structured and the checks and balances between the different governmental structures. He says in order to lay a foundation for the separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which is essential for the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be separate so that the other departments have as little power as possible to appoint the members of the others. He says that if the separation is rigorously adhered to it requires that all the appointments for the executive legislative and judiciary should come from the same authority: the people. Madison says that a plan of constructing several departments would be less difficult in practice then it appears. He says there will be some difficulties, however, and additional expense will be necessary to make sure that the plan for several departments is executed well. Madison says that these difficulties dictate that some deviations from the plan must occur. He says the judiciary would suffer if the people chose the judges to staff it because they are not aware of the qualifications for a judge. Madison believes that because the members of the Supreme Court are chosen for life they should be free of interference from the other branches.
Madison says it is very important for each department to be independent of the other departments because all other sense of independence to make decisions would be minimal. He says it is very important to give the those who run each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments from the other departments. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the people who fill each department must be tempered with the constitutional rights of each department. Doing so will be necessary to control the abuses of government. He says government itself is the greatest of all reflections on human nature. Madison also says that if men were angels no government would be necessary. He also says that if angels were to govern men no external or internal controls on government would be necessary. The great difficulty in setting up a government of men to govern men is that government must first be allowed to control the governed, and also control itself. A dependence on the people is the primary control of government, but there must be other controls in place.
The other control that must be put into place is a system where each department has the ability to check on the others and balance their power. Madison wonders is it not possible to give each department an equal power of self-defense. In Republican governments the legislative authority necessarily predominates. Therefore, it is necessary to divide the power of the legislature in two different branches and to give them different modes of election and different principles of action. It is necessary that these branches are as little connected with each other as possible. He says it may be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by further precautions. According to Madison it may be necessary to divide the legislatures power between branches so the legislative branch doesn't become too powerful. He says the executive on the other hand is weak and should have its power fortified.
He says that if the principles on which these observations are founded are just as he believes they are and they are applied to the federal and state constitutions, it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond within the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test. There are two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system which places it in an interesting point of view according to Madison. In a republic, all the power that the people give is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by dividing government into distinct and separate departments. In America, the power given by the people is first divided between two distinct governments and then the portion of power divided among each is subdivided among distinct and separate departments. He says the right of the people are doubly secure this way. The different governments will control each other and at the same time be controlled by itself. Secondly, it is the importance of the republic not only to guard society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of society against the injustice of the other part. He says different classes of citizens will have different interests. If it's a majority is united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are two methods for providing against this evil. One is to create a will in the community independent of the majority – of the society itself. The other is to comprehend in a society of so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable if not impractical. Madison says the first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. The situation is at best a precarious security. A power independent of the society might as well expose the unjust view of the major as the rightful interest of the minor party, and this may possibly be turned against both parties. He says the second method will be exemplified in the United States. All authority will be derived from and dependent on society, but the society itself will be broken into so many parts, classes of citizens that the rights of individuals or of the majority will be in little danger from combinations of the majority Madison says in a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. He says one case is a multiplicity of interest, and the other is a multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and the number of sects. Madison says this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and the number of people under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all those friends of the Republican government.
Justices the purpose of government. It is the purpose of a civil society. Justice will be pursued until it is obtained, or until liberty is lost in the pursuit. In a society where stronger factions can readily suppress the weaker anarchy may rain. In such a state, the weaker individual is not protected against the violence of the stronger. In anarchy, stronger individuals are prompted to submit to any form of government no matter how bad in hopes that the strong will be protected from the weak. Madison believes that self-government works in a large country containing many different groups. He says that there are countries that are too big for self-government, but that the Constitution makes self-government practical and probable in the United States.
I agree with Hamilton that checks and balances are necessary. Without the checks and balances the Constitution calls for there is nothing to keep one branch of overstepping its bounds. The debate surrounding the health-care law illustrates why checks and balances are necessary. The Obama administration championed the health-care law with an individual mandate. Many argue that the individual mandate of the law is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court must now decide if that's true, and if it is strike down the law in its current form to make sure that the Constitution is protected. The example of the health-care law proves that the checks and balances that Hamilton champions are working. The fact that checks and balances are still working is the greatest proof that Hamilton was right to champion them at the time the Constitution was ratified.
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