Federalist #27

The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (cont.)  (Hamilton)

The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority  in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (The Same Subject Continued); Alexander Hamilton

In Federalist Paper #27, Hamilton takes on the issue of whether or not military force will be necessary to execute the laws adopted by the newly formed government.  

He begins by acknowledging that various sources have alleged that a Constitution designed along the lines of the one proposed by the Constitutional Convention cannot function without military force to enforce its laws.  He discredits this assertion by pronouncing that its foundation is unsupported by any precise or intelligible reasons to substantiate it.  In the remainder of this paper, he proceeds to show cause why a government enacted in the proper manner should have no frequent occasion to use force to enact its laws.  It does deserve mention, however, that while his points may have merit, he also fails to employ "precise or intelligible" reasons to support his positions.

Here, I'll introduce what I believe is Hamilton's central theme in this paper.  He states:  "I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that their (the American citizenry) confidence in and obedience to a government will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration."  He reiterates this particular point at the end of the paper when he says "…there is good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the Union, if its powers are administered with a common share of prudence."  Hamilton goes on to propose that an injudicious exercise of the powers of even the best government can cause the citizenry to engage in disorderly activities.  He is suggesting, then, that government administered in a fair and wise way will win over the citizenry and there will no concomitant need to use military force to impose the laws of the land.  He further makes it plain that such a government would do well to always strive to refrain from using such force to mandate compliance from its own people.

Hamilton also devotes some time to contrasting the efficacy of the localized governments with the national government.  He concludes that there exists the probability that the national government will be better administered than the localized governments.  In general, he broadly estimates that national bodies will be composed of men of higher quality and greater knowledge and that there will be decreased likelihood of destructive factionalism at the national level than at the local levels.  He also contends that any unruly elements in a particular state are more likely to positively respond to threats of powerful national intervention than they are to the threats from a more limited state government.  He suggests the confederation of the states will bring about a perceived collective power that will result in due obedience by the citizenry, but, again, his central premise rests on the notion that a national government must have the faith and confidence of its citizenry as a consequence of its own fair and wise conduct.

Hamilton will continue his discussion of the general use of force in Federalist Paper #28.