Federalist #55

The Total Number of the House of Representatives  (Madison)

Madison, in the opening of Federalist 55, defends the size of the House of Representatives. Apparently, during the time of the House’s creation, there was much debate regarding the small size projected for the legislative body. The arguments surrounding the House’s size deals with four issues: First, a small House would not be a good keeper and defender of the public’s interests; second, the members would not have knowledge of the local interest and problems; third, the House would be populated with a “class of citizens which will sympathize least with the feelings of the mass of people;” lastly, the small number of members is not proportional to the population and this will only get worse as the population grows.  Madison continues through the remainder of the paper by focusing on the first point in depth.

Madison dissects the first point in the people’s arguments: “The charges exhibited against it are, first, that so small a number of representatives will be an unsafe depository of the public interests.” Madison states, “no political problem is less susceptible of a precise solution than that which relates to the number most convenient for a representative legislature.” Since the ratio among state population and representation varies, Madison argues that there could not be a mathematical formula to balance out this ratio.  However, he believes the ratio of people in the House would be large enough to protect against improper uses, but small enough to avoid confusion. 

Madison approaches the issue regarding the small number of representatives by explaining the House will start with sixty-five members. He then explains, within the next three years, a survey consensus will take place and the number will be “augmented to one for every thirty thousand inhabitants.”  At this point, with the first consensus, the number of representatives would rise to one hundred or more.  In twenty-five years, the number of representatives would climb to two hundred, and so on. Madison objects to the idea that the “present genius of the people of America,” regardless of the number, would continually elect, every two years, a group of representatives that would “be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery”; that a group of sixty-five men who are “capable of recommending themselves to the choice of the people at large, who would either desire or dare, within the short space of two years, to betray the solemn trust committed to them”; and that any state legislature which would sit idly by and allow for the abuse of their liberties from House powers.

Madison then supposes that maybe there is a fear of foreign gold and bribery that could infiltrate the House.  Simply put, if this was going to happen, Madison contends it would have already happened. He illustrates that during the revolution there were many opportunities for the government to take advantage of gold and bribery, but this did not occur.  Madison ponders that maybe the danger is a belief that the other branches pose a threat, specifically the role of the President in making appointments.  Luckily for the people, Madison states that, “fortunately, the Constitution has provided a still further safeguard…members of the Congress are rendered ineligible to any civil offices that  may be increased or of which the emoluments may be increased….” Thus, the fear of another branch is rendered inconsequential.