Federalist #3

Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (cont.)  (Jay)

Federalist No. 3 begins with an observation that, among all of the reasons why a people might endeavor typo enter into a union like the United States of America, safety is their first concern as this safety is necessary for peace and tranquility.  In order to secure this safety it is necessary to defend against both foreign and domestic threats alike.  In No. 3, Jay argues that a strong national government devised through “cordial union” is the surest means of defense against these threats.  He goes on to discuss how the union might defend against foreign threats in a way superior to that available under the Articles.

Jay begins by pointing out that a united America will be less bellicose than the each individual state would be on its own, or at the very least responsible for less aggression as the ambitions of one nation are mathematically one-thirteenth those of thirteen individual sovereign states, each with its own agenda.  For this reason Jay argues that a united America will be more likely to preserve the peace than thirteen states.

Jay also observes that, at the time No. 3 was written, the United States had entered into treaties with six nations, 5 of which had sufficient maritime power to threaten her.  As one just cause of war is given as the violation of treaties, Jay argues that a united America is less likely to find itself in the position of having to fend off another nation which has violated a treaty.  Also, Jay argues that one national government is more likely than those of the thirteen states to observe “the laws of nations” thus minimizing the risk of breaking a treaty.  Jay reasons that such a national government is more likely to keep the peace for two main reasons: first that the national government will more consistent in signing and obeying treaties than will the governments of the thirteen states; and, second, because the national government will be theoretically less vulnerable to the interests of regional factions than will the governments of the thirteen states.

Jay concludes by offering two illustrative examples, one from America’s own history and one from Europe’s.  Jay observes that none of the Indian Wars from fought from 1776 to 1787 had been the result of violence instigated by the federal government under the Articles but rather by the governments of individual states, each acting in their own interests.  Jay also notes that Louis XIV of France was able to compel the Doge of Genoa to appease him following hostilities in a way that he would not have been able to compel Britain, Spain or any other powerful nation.  The comparison here is obvious; Genoa was a city state on the disunited Italian peninsula.  As Jay would have been familiar with Machiavelli’s argument that a united Italy would be better able to resist foreign aggressors, he is no doubt drawing a parallel argument with this example.