Federalist #25

The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (cont.)  (Hamilton)

In Essay 25, Hamilton continues the need for the establishment of a federal army; however, he shifts his thoughts from those of external threats to ones arising from within the United States itself. Hamilton argues that external threats involve the nation as a whole rather than one or a grouping of states. Also, an army funding by a national treasury would prevent the unbalanced funding of the national army by wealthier states while smaller and less wealthy ones wreak the benefits without sharing in the cost. Finally, Hamilton argues that a national army would greatly reduce the likely of inter-state conflict among the states or a challenge to the national government.

Hamilton opens with the approach that European powers border the United States “from Maine to Georgia” and while the risk imposed in a particular region may differ across the country, such risks are of a national common interest for security. In seeing these threats regionally rather than nationally, Hamilton argues, would prompt a rush for each neighboring state to arm itself against its American neighbor just as it would against a European or Native American tribe. Having a common army, funded by national funds, and overseen by a national legislature would spread out the burden for more at-risk states with those of more protected ones and thus, lessen the risk for regional rivalries.

With such varied threat levels in place, north to south and east to west, certain states, without a federally funded army, would undertake upon themselves the investment to protect their borders. This, Hamilton contends, would put both the national and less at-risk states in the position of relying on such states for protection and this could lead to developing rivalries among some states, as noted above. At the national level, the disproportionate amount of resources across the country would , in essence, transfer national security “from the federal head to the individual members” and this would, in Hamilton’s view, place the constitution and Confederation in danger, and would further be “an inversion to the primary principal to our political association.”

Hamilton shifts to how developing state rivalries and developed military interests could serve as cause for those states to reject the federal constitution, and the federal government, with no army of its own, would likely be unable to respond. As has been put forth in previous essays, Hamilton asserts that whenever an issue arises between the states and the federal “head,” the people will almost always choose to go with their states. Adding to this the presence of a military force, it would be inevitable that states, in time, would make demands upon and eventually subvert the federal constitution. This is why the framers of the Confederation prohibited states from having troops and ships unless consented by Congress.

Hamilton concludes with a common sense approach in favor of a federal army. As noted in Essay 24, the issue of a standing army in peacetime is vague at the state level. A national framework of when, where for how long, and for how much, in regarding to a peacetime standing army would be a common national point of interest that is subject to the people. Having multiple approaches, Hamilton asserts, would put America at true disadvantage, and thus, danger in the event of foreign invasion or internal hostility.