In Federalist paper #63, Madison continues with the 5th
desideratum about the utility of the Senate. He first puts into
perspective
the criticism “that a senate appointed not not immediately by the
people and the term of 6 years must gradually acquire a dangerous
preeminence in the government and finally transform it into a tyrannical
aristocracy.” He then started the discussion from the
fourth paragraph of his last paper.
According
to Madison, the senate as select and stable body of the government will
be aware of the opinion of foreign powers. Being attentive
to the judgment of other nations will ensure that our plans are
perceived as wise and honorable policy. If debate on internal policy is
unresolved, the opinions of impartial nations might be a prudent guide
to follow. Madison continues to indicate that, a
government to effectively serve the people, must have a body that is in
the office long enough to link operations together to form a train of
events extending over a period longer than that of the term of
representatives in the House.
For Madison, having a second body dissimilar from another will
protect the people better than having the whole legislative trust in the
hands of one body of men who may betray the people.
With
respect to the criticism that the senate will transform itself into a
tyrannical aristocracy, Madison gives several examples of
senates designed similarly to the federal proposal that shown no such
tendency, among them are Maryland with a senate very much similar to the
federal senate, then the British example where the senate with an
hereditary assembly of opulent nobles though elected
for 6 years, along with the House made of a small portion of the
population.
Madison
mentions other examples from history similar to the example of the
Britain. Accordingly, it is more likely that the body of
government elected by the people will eventually take power from the
senate (Sparta, Rome, Carthage, etc). Drawing upon these facts and
previous arguments, Madison concludes that the senate will never be able
to transform itself into an independent and aristocratic
body. If attempted, the force of the representatives of the people will
restore constitutional authority.
Madison’s argument in favor of stable government with a competent senate is self-evident in the United States’ political environment. The usefulness of the senate, as a wiser body in the legislative branch, can be attested during the time of crisis on a particular issue. However, Madison’s conclusion that the senate will never be able to transform itself into an independent and aristocratic body is perhaps a wrong perception. Madison could not have control over what the Senate of U.S. would become today. The ability for Senators to engage in unlimited debate has now become a vicious partisan tool of obstruction in order to prevent any business to be conducted. Did Madison foresee the rules of the “filibuster” as a handicap the proper functioning of the senate and the federal government? Perhaps not! As Madison would suggest, no constitution is perfect. Improvements can occur with time. But the defense of Madison with respect to the tyrannical aristocracy issue of the senate was weak in a sense. For instance, the use of the filibuster has allowed the minority of either of party in the senate to create this kind of independence and aristocracy that critics were talking about. For instance, instead of an effort of last resort, the filibuster has become the first resort by the Republican minority, and it has become increasingly rare for the senate to pass any major legislation, approve nominations and pass annual appropriation bills. My goal here is not to blame Madison for the current situations in the senate. But I can say that the senate’s dysfunction and the continued abuse of the filiburster have led to paralysis all throughout the federal government.
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