Federalist #49

Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention (Madison)

Madison begins Federalist 49 by pondering a viewpoint proposed by Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson, after penning the “Notes on the State of Virginia,” drafted a rough constitution that he hoped would be ratified. In this constitution, he reveals the strengths and weaknesses of a republican form of government. He illustrates the “dangerous propensities against which it [the republican government] ought to be guarded.” To keep one branch from becoming too powerful, Jefferson suggests, “whenever any two of the three branches of government shall concur in opinion, each by two thirds of their whole number, that a convention is necessary for altering the constitution, or correcting breaches of it, a convention shall be called for that purpose.”

Since Madison concurs that the people are the backbone of power in a republican government, he understands why Jefferson would feel it necessary to consult them when one branch is becoming too powerful. However, Madison has words of caution for this action. He contends that frequent appeals to the government insinuate a flaw within said government system. Since society is always tumultuous and changing, and while it is important to tweak the flaws of government, too much interference can lead to instability. Where instability is prevalent, revolt can be imminent.

Madison continues to say that, in a republican form of government, it is usually the legislature that increases it powers over the other branches. This occurs for several reasons. First, according to Madison, the people favor the members of the legislature more than they favor the occupants of the executive or the judiciary. Secondly, the executive is few in number and the people are usually jealous of the operators of it. In fact, people usually blame the administration during low times. Thirdly, the judiciary, like the executive, is few in number, and its members, because of the appointment process and their lifelong tenure, are far removed from the people. Therefore, any appeals over inter-branch squabbles would probably come from the executive or judiciary, said Madison. However, because legislators frequently touch basis with the people back home, listening to their complaints and heeding their interests, from which a personal relationship ensues, legislators are the better “confidential guardians of the rights and liberties of the people.”

Madison claims that none of the federal branches is superior—or inferior—to the other. They are coequal branches forced to work together in the governing process. Should one branch usurp the powers of another branch, the people, who created them and who delegated certain powers and responsibilities to them, will have the final say over the matter. The people, through the amendment process, could modify or abolish powers and functions of either branch. However, Madison forewarns his readers that too many appeals to the government to modify or abolish existing principles could destroy traditions and long-standing customs, both of which are eminently important to sustaining an orderly and lawful republic.