Federalist #19

The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (cont.)  (Hamilton & Madison) 

In Federalist Paper #19, Hamilton and Madison continue their review of confederacies, but on this occasion they focus on contemporary institutions (for their time) rather than on those of ancient origin.  The institution that receives the disproportionate share of the attention in Federalist Paper #19 is the Germanic federalist system.

The German federal system has a diet (a formal national assembly), which represents the component members of the confederation and has the general responsibility of enacting national legislation; an executive magistrate, who has the power to negate decrees of the diet; and two judiciary tribunals that have supreme jurisdiction in matters involving the German empire and its members.  A more detailed enumeration of the constitutional duties of the diet and the executive magistrate reveals the diet can make war and peace; assess quotas of troops and money; arrange and contract for alliances; regulate financial matters; and enact censure against disobedient members.  Again, the executive magistrate can negate resolutions of the diet and it can also make proposals to it; name ambassadors; fill vacant electorates; found universities; receive and apply public revenues; and generally superintend the public safety. 

From such an apparent capable organization of constitutional powers, Hamilton and Madison suggest that much could be expected.  The fundamental premise on which the German confederation rests, however, is that the German empire is a community of sovereigns and the diet represents sovereigns and addresses its laws to them.  This has caused the German empire to be incapable of effectively governing its members, has made it insecure against external dangers, and has caused internal disharmony.  Even the exigency of addressing military decisions is complicated by endless discussions that highlight the jealousies and disagreements among the various sovereign bodies.  Equally problematic is the inability to maintain order and dispense justice among the sovereign citizens.  Hamilton and Madison describe the subject German union as a feeble and precarious one and undoubtedly they have made the analogy to it and the Amphictyonic confederation described in Federalist Paper #18. 

Hamilton and Madison also cite the government of Poland as another example of a decrepit regime that is enervated by its constituency of local sovereigns.  They note how Poland has recently been relieved of one-third of its people and territories by its more powerful neighbors. 

Switzerland, too, is briefly mentioned.  Here, Hamilton and Madison state that the efficacy of the Swiss union was found lacking whenever disagreements of real consequence were presented to it.

To this point, Federalist Papers #17, 18, and 19 have failed to present a direct and emphatic argument for a stronger central American government, but it appears certain the subject papers are laying the groundwork for it.  Hamilton and Madison will continue this discussion of the inadequacy of the confederation to preserve the union in Federalist Paper #20.